INTRODUCTION
United Nations peace operations have evolved from the traditional model of peacekeeping, in which UN forces sought to enforce ceasefires and prevent conflict recurrence, to now include comparatively robust peace enforcement missions which target specific actors in ongoing conflicts. Many of the implications of this shift from operations focusing on postconflict stabilization to those that focus on active fighting have yet to be fully explored. To that end, this analysis examines how peace enforcement affects violence against civilians (VAC).
The relationship between violence against civilians and peace enforcement is important because enhancing the protection of civilians has often been seen as justification for more robust UN missions and mandates. Article 3 of the recent Kigali Principles summarizes this emerging norm by calling on troop-contributing countries to use force to protect civilians. 1 Providing peacekeepers with information on how their operations are likely to affect violence against civilians will help such forces account for risk and make the strategic decisions that are best for the security of civilian populations.
This paper utilizes geospatial analysis to examine how peace enforcement missions affect where actors are most likely to use violence against civilians and whether such strategies result in consistent patterns of change in the geographic dispersion of violence against civilians that could be useful for informing policymakers.
A brief description of peace enforcement and violence against civilians is followed by a methodological section detailing the data sources, mapping, and analytical techniques used. Six peace enforcement operations in Africa are then examined to provide context and better describe the dispersion of events of violence against civilians by targeted actors before and during intervention.
From these cases, two clear trends emerge. First, the geographic area in which violence against civilians occurs tends to contract after the start of intervention. Across these cases, peace enforcement coincided with a 50.1% decrease in the size of the area in which violence against civilians was most likely to occur. Second, the epicenter of violence activity against civilians remains static, with the mean center of events shifting an average of only 62 kilometers. Generally speaking, actors reduce the area over which they commit violence against civilians, and rather than committing such actions in new areas as a result of intervention, they withdraw into areas where they have previously used violence against civilians most frequently.
These are unique findings with important implications regarding both the overall effectiveness of peace enforcement as a form of civilian protection and tactical and operationallevel decision-making for military forces engaged in such operations. In the face of massive conflict areas and limited resources, these findings can help forces understand how to concentrate troop presence and intelligence assets in areas most likely to experience violence against civilians, allowing them to preempt or quickly react to such threats. 
PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS
Peace enforcement is defined as military intervention by an outside actor-either multilateral or single-state-which targets a specific actor in a conflict with military operations intended to end a conflict and/or reduce violence against civilians. Peace enforcement has been the subject of intense debate, particularly in the context of UN missions.
Much of this debate was catalyzed by the creation of the UN's Intervention Brigade in 2013. The Intervention Brigade has a more offensive mandate and greater military capabilities than traditional UN peacekeepers and has been conducting operations targeting several rebel groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Many feel that such offensive operations should not be undertaken by the UN, given its traditional role as a neutral mediator. 2 Such operations have been called a "clear contradiction of principles guiding UN peacekeeping operations including impartiality, obtaining consent of the main parties, and only using force in self-defence or in defence of the mandate." 3 Beyond concerns specific to the UN's role, there is also disagreement over whether such operations by any actor have utility as a tool for civilian protection. Critics charge that peace enforcement may turn foreign civilians into targets of violence, 4 escalate conflicts in a manner which increases the risk to local civilians, 5 and detract attention from efforts to find sustainable political solutions to conflicts. 6 Possible benefits of peace enforcement include permanently defeating the targeted actor, restricting their freedom of movement, cutting off access to sources of income, or raising the risks posed by being a member of an armed group.
Unfortunately, there are limited empirical analyses of the relationship between peace enforcement and conflict dynamics, including violence against civilians. Some research indicates that actors targeted with intervention, including peace enforcement, increase their use of violence against civilians in an effort to extract resources from and exert control over those civilians. 7 However, relatively little is known about the geographic and spatial characteristics of this violence. Better insight into how the geography of violence against civilians is affected by changes in the strategic environment, such as the beginning of peace enforcement operations, will be valuable in helping policymakers better understand where violence against civilians is most likely to occur, thereby allowing for more accurate positioning of troops, equipment, and intelligence assets, and more effective civilian protection. The Geography of Violence Against Civilians: Implications for Peace Enforcement | 3
DATA AND METHODS
The analyses in this report utilize geographic information system (GIS) tools and event-level data to identify and map local patterns of violence against civilians in intrastate conflict in an effort to more precisely define the area of study.
Many conflicts occur in relatively isolated areas and an analysis of them based on country-level geographic data would be misleading. 8, 9 The Democratic Republic of Congo, Thailand, Chechnya, and Myanmar are cases in which the area of conflict is fairly isolated, and features of both human and physical geography in the conflict-affected areas could differ significantly from country-level characteristics.
This report utilizes some of the pioneering methods increasingly being applied to the study of conflict in an attempt to more realistically represent the area of study. A standard deviational ellipse, also sometimes referred to as a directional distribution, is used to visualize the distribution of point data and generate a more realistic area of study. 10 Standard ellipses are centered on the mean center of events of violence against civilians and the size and rotation of the ellipse represent the distribution of events 11 (see Figure 1 ). In the context of this paper, the standard ellipse generated by the events of violence against civilians is used as an approximation of the conflict zone in which violence against civilians is most likely to occur. If peace enforcement affects the decisions targeted actors make about where to use violence against civilians, one would expect to see shifts in the size and/or location of these standard ellipses.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project dataset derives actor-specific, geolocated conflict event data on 60 countries across Africa and Asia from media reports and local sources stretching back to 1997.
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These data are actor-specific, have fairly exact geolocation and dating, and categorize different conflict event types such as violence against civilians, battles, and remote violence. The data also have some potential biases, primarily due to a reliance on media reports, which often vary in level of coverage across conflict location, actors involved, and the type of conflict event. With that said, it is still the best data available for geographically disaggregated study of actor-specific conflict events.
Raw ACLED data went through several rounds of cleaning. First, data were sorted to use only events involving the actors in the relevant cases. Then the data were filtered by event type and events listed as "violence against civilians,"
"remote violence," and "strategic development" were retained. Events listed as "remote violence" and "strategic developments" were examined to see if they could also constitute violence against civilians (for example, Boko
Haram's suicide bombings of markets). Events listed as "violence against civilians" were reviewed to ensure their accuracy. Events were removed from the dataset if they met one or more of the following criteria: instances of clear duplication, instances of clearly incorrect geocoding, instances where it was clear from the source data that the event was incorrectly attributed to the actor, and instances in which it was clear from the source data that no violence against civilians actually occurred. A log of all events removed during vetting was retained.
Pre-and post-intervention periods are defined by either the day on which the intervening actor publicly announced intentions to intervene against the targeted actor or the first day on which a conflict event between the intervening and targeted actors was recorded in the ACLED dataset, whichever came first. Announcements of intervention were 
INTERVENTION CASES
The focus of this analysis is not all violence against civilians by any group involved in a conflict, but rather those acts of violence committed by the armed actor targeted with intervention. Selected cases involved an outside force entering a conflict in direct opposition to one of the actors in the conflict. Future research into how actors who experienced intervention differ in their distribution of violence against civilians from those actors who were not targeted with intervention would also be valuable, but inclusion of these cases was beyond the scope of the narrow question being explored in this report. While it was not a criterion for case selection, in all the cases discussed the targeted party to the conflict is a violent non-state actor (VNSA). Therefore, findings may or may not hold true in cases in which an outside actor intervenes against a state rather than against a VNSA. Cases selected for analysis include three actors The Intervention Brigade took its first offensive actions in August of 2013, shelling M23 positions outside of Goma. 17 Subsequent operations by the IB expanded the security perimeter around Goma and assaulted various M23 positions. These actions proved to be quite effective, as only a month after the offensive against M23 began, the rebel group was calling for a ceasefire and agreed to resume peace talks with the Congolese government. 18 By November, M23 had renounced its insurgency 19 and its military leader, Sultani Makenga, and 1,700 fighters fled to Uganda, where they surrendered and were disarmed. However, as in the M23 case, there was also a dramatic reduction in the geographic dispersion of violence against civilians. The standard ellipse generated by events of violence against civilians prior to intervention had an area of 22,018 square kilometers. After intervention, this figure dropped to 8,324 square kilometers, a reduction of 62.2%. As in nearly all of the cases, there is tremendous overlap between the pre-and post-intervention standard ellipses, with the smaller post-intervention ellipse almost entirely within the standard ellipse generated by pre-intervention events.
Actor

Allied Democratic Forces
That said, there was a significant post-intervention shift north in the mean center of events, very near the urban center of Beni.
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
The 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda Violence Against Civilians
The RUF emerged from the chaos of Sierra Leone's civil war in the mid-1990s. The group quickly spread from the area along the border of Liberia (whose leader, Charles Taylor, was supporting the group in a bid for regional dominance and access to Sierra Leone's diamond resources) to threaten Freetown and the survival of the democratically elected government. The group maintained control of large swathes of the country's interior, exploiting its resources and committing violence against civilians on a massive scale. 30 Initial British intervention in the conflict came in the form of a limited mission to evacuate its nationals from Freetown. 31 However, the mission grew in scope, beginning to train and assist the security forces of Sierra Leone and operate in support of both the army of Sierra Leone and the existing UN force. Eventually British forces undertook limited but direct engagement with the RUF. 32 British assistance seems to have played a role in turning the tide of the conflict in favor of government forces, and roughly six months after intervention, a ceasefire had been signed and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process began for RUF fighters. 
Ansar al-Dine
Revolutionary United Front Violence Against Civilians
The Mali which leads to polarization in the distribution of events, combined with having relatively few data points, as mentioned, which makes the standard ellipses more heavily influenced by geographic outliers. While acknowledging this heightened shift, both measures, pre-and post-intervention, are centered on the area lying roughly between northern Mali's three major population centers of Goa, Timbuktu, and Kidal. This may demonstrate that while the distribution of events did shift, there is no indication that intervention led to a strategic shift in violence against civilians away from these areas.
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Boko Haram
Multilateral intervention against Boko Haram has been successful at pushing the group out of population centers and into more remote areas, as well as reducing the area over which violence against civilians occurs. However, in contrast to the majority of the groups in the study, Boko Haram seems to have reacted to intervention by abandoning efforts to actually combat security forces and focusing almost exclusively on targeting civilians.
Boko Haram developed as an Islamic fundamentalist movement in northeastern Nigeria in the early 2000s. 37 The group's violent activities started largely with targeted assassinations of local leaders, religious rivals, and members of security services. In the early 2010s the movement developed into a full-on insurgency, engaging in direct fighting with the Nigerian armed forces, and by 2014 the group had taken control of large swathes of territory in northeastern Nigeria. The group engaged in widespread violence against civilians, including abductions, forced "marriages," bombings of civilian sites, and attacks on towns and villages that displaced millions. 38 By 2014, the spillover effects of Boko Haram's growing insurgency had begun to affect the security of neighboring Cameroon, 39 Niger, 40 and Chad, 41 
Boko Haram Violence Against Civilians
The Geography of Violence Against Civilians: Implications for Peace Enforcement | 11 activity in the group's stronghold in the Sambisa Forest 42 and their declining capacity to carry out acts of remote violence in the central and southern portions of the country with the same frequency as in the pre-intervention period.
Cross-Case Patterns
The cases shed light on some fairly consistent and interesting patterns. In addition, they may serve as the basis for further research on how peace enforcement affects violence against civilians.
The first area that should be examined is the targeted actor's use of violence against civilians as a proportion of all violence prior to and after intervention. Pre-and post-intervention mean centers of violence against civilians shifted between 18 and 130 kilometers, with an average of 62 kilometers. This is a surprisingly limited amount of movement given the distances covered by the conflict areas. Together, these two patterns in the changing distributions of violence against civilians give us a better idea of what areas are most likely to experience concentrated violence against civilians after intervention. Generally speaking, actors reduce the area over which they commit violence against civilians, and rather than committing such actions in new areas as a result of intervention, they withdraw into areas in which they have previously used violence against civilians most frequently.
What causes this tendency to reduce the geographic scope of violence against civilians and withdraw into small areas when confronted with peace enforcement cannot be definitively answered without much more detailed research and is likely rooted in a variety of factors. However, one of the more interesting possibilities is that it is a response to the change in their strategic environment which peace enforcement represents.
Academics have demonstrated a link between deterioration in the relative capabilities of an armed actor and an increase in the actor's use of violence against civilians. 43 The theoretical arguments which generated these studies were based on the hypothesis that a shift in the balance of power which weakens an armed actor makes it more difficult for them to extract resources 
UN peacekeepers takes stock of weapons and ammunition collected during the demobilization process in Matembo, North Kivu, DRC.UN Photo/ Martine Perret
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Inception of peace enforcement certainly constitutes a decline in the relative strength of the targeted actor. If targeted actors react to such shifts with increased violence against civilians in an attempt to retain control over the civilian population, it may also make sense that they do so in a more concentrated geographic area. Given the shift in power, the targeted actor may determine that it is no longer rational to attempt to retain or establish control over the same extent of territory and civilian populations they had once thought possible.
The reduced comparative strength of targeted actors would simultaneously reduce the area over which they are capable of maintaining majority control and call into question any areas over which they had previously exercised complete control. The pattern of standard-ellipse reduction may suggest targeted actors' attempts to maintain control of smaller areas are a reflection of decreased ambitions for partial or total territorial control. Definitively explaining the report's findings will take significantly more in-depth research and there are almost certainly multiple factors at work, but it may very well be that these findings are closely related to an armed actor's strategic calculations regarding the use of violence against civilians as a tool for maintaining control over civilian populations.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The first simple implication of the research is that peace enforcement can be a valuable tool for civilian protection. In the majority of cases in this study, targeted actors decreased their use of violence against civilians as a share of their violent activities by a modest average of 9.2%. What will be much more important for future research is identifying how variables like VNSA characteristics (such as ideology, sources of funding, and sustained control of territory) and the capabilities of the intervening force (such as troop strength, equipment, mandate, and deployment patterns) predict how a targeted actor uses violence against civilians in response to peace enforcement.
It is clear, however, that peace enforcement contains the geographic scope if not the intensity of events of violence against civilians. The implications of this finding are complex. Obviously, violence against civilians with a reduced geographic scope but increased intensity is not beneficial for civilians living in the area with a higher density of violence against civilians. However, this containment effect could provide particularly valuable information for policymakers attempting to define the scope of civilian protection needs.
Containing the scope of violence against civilians, while having no civilian protection benefits in and of itself, is helpful for the planning of efforts to prevent and react to ongoing violence against civilians. This lack of adequate capabilities for intelligence collection and analysis has often directly contributed to the failure of UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians. One clear example of this is the persistent violence against civilians in the area around Beni, DRC. Over the last several years, hundreds of civilians have been killed in and around the city. 46 While the real picture may be more complex, it is widely believed that these attacks are being carried out by the ADF, 47 civilians. This has led to one of MONUSCO's most troubling and persistent failures to protect civilians in recent years and has undermined the local population's confidence in the ability of the force to keep them safe. 48 Peacekeeping commanders themselves have also stated that increased situational awareness is critical if forces are to anticipate violence against civilians and be well placed to prevent it. According to an official at MONUSCO headquarters, "you really need intelligence during the operation so you get information that warns you about something, then you can position your forces very accurately to deal with that particular threat." 49 The findings of this report may help fill this gap in tactical intelligence and situational awareness.
Reducing the area of operation to that most likely to experience continued violence against civilians may help missions deploy limited intelligence-collection resources more efficiently. Drones, satellites, aircraft, and other technical intelligence assets can monitor smaller areas that have a higher probability of experiencing violence against civilians.
The pursuit of local sources of human intelligence can be focused largely in communities that have experienced previous violence against civilians. A more focused understanding of where violence against civilians is most likely to occur helps missions concentrate intelligence assets in those areas and thus increases their ability to detect and quickly respond to imminent or ongoing threats to the civilian population.
Troop deployments and patrols can also be increased in areas where there has been previous violent activity against The findings of this study should not be overstated. They do not offer a predictive model of which town or district will be the next to experience violence against civilians. With that said, findings may provide some insights for force commanders prioritizing the deployment of limited resources in the herculean task of protecting civilians.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This study is only a very preliminary look into the geography of violence against civilians, and in many ways, it raises more questions than it answers. This section A related valuable area of research could look more closely at the relationship between the specific military characteristics of the actors involved and the geographic distribution of violence. How does comparative force size or the structure and deployment patterns of intervening forces affect the geography of violence against civilians?
Are there specific capabilities such as intelligence-collection assets or helicopters, for example, which appear to alter conflict dynamics in a manner that changes where violence against civilians occurs? Enhanced understanding of these issues would be of particular utility for militaries tasked with protecting civilians.
Moreover, further research could be done on the relationship between violence against civilians and additional geographic factors. Terrain type, infrastructure, natural resource sites, and human geography characteristics such as ethno-linguistic groups or population density can be mapped with varying degrees of difficulty and accuracy. All may also have hypothetical effects on where actors commit violence against civilians. Do actors commit violence against civilians away from major roads in order to avoid detection by security forces? Do they choose to target violence in areas of a specific ethnic/linguistic/religious group? Answers to these questions may help forces anticipate which communities are under the greatest threat.
A South African peacekeeper works as a signaller in the DRC. Photo by: Martine Perret.
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A more disaggregated temporal aspect could also be incorporated. Are there common trends in how the geography of violence against civilians changes six months, a year, or three years after intervention? Or perhaps more interestingly, does the geography of violence against civilians appear to shift in reaction to other major conflict events such as the announcement of sanctions, ceasefires, or the arrival of new forces?
Finally, this analysis could be broken down by different types of violence against civilians. Many of the theories of how and why actors use violence against civilians make a distinction between indiscriminate violence and selective violence which targets those who are known or suspected supporters of opposing armed groups. Theories on why groups choose to use selective or indiscriminate violence revolve around issues of control, relative strength, and access to accurate information. If geographic proxies could be developed for these factors and the source data from geocoded conflict databases could be used to reliably distinguish between selective and indiscriminate violence against civilians, new methods of testing some of the field's most basic theories about the drivers of violence against civilians could be tested using geospatial analysis.
CONCLUSION
The changing geographic dispersion of violence against civilians during conflict is an area which has yet to attract considerable study. This report makes initial forays into analyzing the changing patterns of this form of violence by
VNSAs in the context of peace enforcement missions. In the six cases of peace enforcement in Africa examined in this study, two clear trends emerge. The geographic dispersion of events of violence against civilians contracts once intervention begins and there is a relatively limited shift in the mean center of events. Targeted groups, on balance, do not shift their use of violence against civilians to new geographic areas, but simply withdraw and continue its use in smaller areas where such violence was already prevalent. This finding is far from definitive and there will certainly always be cases and individual events which break from this general trend. That said, the report provides some insights and raises new questions about when and where VNSAs employ violence against civilians most frequently, which can provide enhanced understanding for policymakers seeking to more effectively protect civilians in the context of peace enforcement missions.
